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Abstract
This study empirically tests the behavior of Sharia and non-Sharia securities investors
towards corporate tax avoidance. If Sharia securities investors make investment
decisions considering Sharia principles, corporate tax avoidance should be viewed as a
bad practice which is contradictory to Sharia principles and it is intolerable for this type
of investors. Using companies from the financial industry for the period of 2007-2018,
the final sample comprises 378 observations for Sharia securities and 167 observations
for non-Sharia securities. This secondary data research is conducted by applying
moderated regression analysis to test the hypothesis. This study finds that the market
responses regarding corporate tax avoidance practices on average are lower (higher) for
Sharia (non-Sharia) securities.
Keywords: Corporate tax avoidance; Sharia securities; Non-sharia securities
JEL: H26, G41, M41
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INTRODUCTION
This study examines the differences
in behavior between Sharia and non-Sharia
investors in responding to bad practices,
which in this study is limited to corporate
tax avoidance2. Previous studies have
widely documented how the market reacts
to bad signals and/or practices, such as
negative earnings shock related to market
uncertainty (Conrad et al. 2002), delay of
bad news disclosure (Kothari et al. 2009),
tax avoidance practices (Goh et al. 2016),
restatement of fraudulent financial
statements (Palmrose et al. 2004) to the
practices of tax evasion, bribery, and
violation of government contract (Davidson
III et al. 1994). Apart from the mixed
findings regarding the market response to
tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman
2010), previous studies in the literature also
have not elucidated the difference in market
response between the Sharia and nonSharia securities investors. Previous studies
that made comparisons between Sharia and
non-Sharia capital markets were also limited to examining the context of securities or
capital market performance rather than the
behavior of investors in each capital market
(e.g., Walkshäusl and Lobe 2012; El
Khamlichi et al. 2014; Dharani et al. 2019).
Islamic funding, including Sharia
securities and banks, is known to be operated based on Sharia principles or Islamic
law (Haniffa and Hudaib 2007) so that
religious investors, especially Muslims,
tend to prefer Sharia securities and banks
for their investment (Jamaludin and
Gerrans 2015; Wan Ahmad et al. 2008). By
considering that Sharia principles are
related to the responsibility of the world
and the hereafter (Haniffa and Hudaib
2007), Sharia ownership is expected to
2

Following Dyreng et al. (2008) and Hanlon and
Heitzman (2010), this study defines tax avoidance in
a broad way as all activities undertaken to reduce tax
payments so as to include tax avoidance at all levels
of legality and aggressiveness. However, this study
argues that tax avoidance in any form and for any
reason is unjustifiable, unethical, and sinful from a

discourage tax avoidance practices
considered as company mis-behavior, at
least according to Islamic law. Analogous
to the institutional ownership (Khurana and
Moser 2013) and family ownership (Chen
et al. 2010) in making difference, this study
seeks to investigate whether Sharia
securities investors will have a different
response to tax avoidance than the nonSharia securities investors. Therefore, this
study is concerned with comparing the
responses of Sharia investors and nonSharia investors.
Specifically, several previous studies
have indicated that investors’ personal
values or social norms can in-fluence
investment decisions (e.g., Anand and
Cowton 1993; Pasewark and Riley 2010;
Borgers et al. 2015), including decisions
related to the response to information
disclosed by companies to the market.
Religiosity as a reflection of one’s level of
adherence to religious values and beliefs
(Worthington et al. 2003) requires that
religious investors, especially Muslims,
make investment decisions in accordance
with Sharia principles (Walkshäusl and
Lobe 2012). In Sharia principles, duties and
obligations related to the management of
funds entrusted to the company are interpreted as accountability to God and are a
form of worship so that violations committed by the companies are deemed as sinful
and result in punishment in the afterlife
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2007). This way, bad
practices that are judged to be incompatible
with these principles are more intolerable
for religious investors, including tax noncompliance (Alam et al. 2017). Therefore,
assuming that Sharia securities are more
demanded by religious investors, this study
expects Sharia securities investors to
respond less positively (more negatively) to
sharia perspective. Doing tax avoidance means that
management is negligent in using the funds
entrusted (Alam et al. 2017) which must be
accountable to God in the hereafter (Haniffa and
Hudaib 2007). It also reduces government revenue
for social welfare and hurts justice for honest
taxpayers (Scholz 2003).
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corporate tax avoidance than non-Sharia
securities investors.
This study contributes to the existing
literature in two ways. First, by taking a
perspective of belief-adjustment theory, our
study complements the recent literature on
market response to tax avoidance between
Sharia and non-Sharia investors. Second,
our empirical evidence offers insights and
helps us to understand that the market
responses regarding corporate tax avoidance practices on average are lower
(higher) for Sharia (non-Sharia) securities.
Overall, this study has several
important implications for the literature,
companies, and government. By partitioning Sharia and non-Sharia securities,
this study shed a light on the debate in the
literature regarding the mixed evidence of
market response to tax avoidance. Clearly,
consistent with the market response to tax
avoidance practices which depends on
investors’ perceptions, our results suggest
that personal value derived from religious
belief plays a role in investors’ behavior in
the capital market. The process of evaluating company practices based on Sharia
principles to make investment decisions as
indicated by this study results contributes to
belief-adjustment theory. Thus, the
companies should be consistent in applying
Sharia principles once it is declared as
Sharia securities. Potential as a control
mechanism, the government’s financial
literacy improvement program is expected
to encourage devout Muslims to enter the
capital market so as to discipline bad corporate practices at least under Islamic law.
The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. Section two discusses the institutional setting, previous studies related to the
topic of this study, theory, and hypothesis
development. Sample, data collection,
variable descriptions, the model used, and
methods for analysis are presented in section three. In section four, analyses and
discussion of the results are presented,
including the results of the robustness
check. Lastly, section five provides the
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conclusions, limitations, and suggestions
for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY,
AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Setting
The Islamic capital market is growing
rapidly within the OIC (Organization of
Islamic Cooperation) countries since the
launch of the DJIM (Dow Jones Islamic
Market) World Index in 1999 (Nurrachmi
2018). Of the OIC countries and even the
world, Indonesia has the largest Muslim
population, which is around 209.1 million
in 2010 and 229.6 million (estimation) in
2020 (Pew Research Center 2015). This
represents a great potential for the
development of the Islamic capital market
and other financial markets, and a huge
number of Sharia investors in Indonesia.
This is supported by the fact that Indonesia
is included in the top ten of the most
developed Islamic financial markets in the
world based on the IFDI (Islamic Finance
Development Indicator) version (Thomson
Reuters 2018). Furthermore, the number of
Sharia securities in Indonesia’s capital
market also continues to increase every
year with growth from 2007 to 2017
reaching 114.75% (OJK 2015, 2018).
On the other hand, Indonesia is
ranked ninth in the world based on the level
of tax avoidance practices with an
estimated loss of up to $6.48 million
(Cobham and Janský 2018). In this regard,
the manufacturing industry contributes to a
large portion of tax revenue in Indonesia.
Particularly, the manufacturing industry
contribution accounts for 31.8% of the total
tax revenue in Indonesia for 2017 (Winanto
2018). Similarly, in 2018, the largest tax
revenue came from the manufacturing
industry amounting to Rp103 trillion
(Anggraeni 2018). Unfortunately, the
manufacturing industry is also the largest
tax avoider in Indonesia. In addition, the
manufacturing industry holds the largest
proportion of total companies listed on the
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Indonesia Stock Exchange, reaching
27.35% (BEI 2018).
While the high population of
Muslims is expected to prevent tax
avoidance practices, Indonesia is in fact one
of the countries with the highest tax
avoidance in the world. This contradiction
makes Indonesia an interesting setting to
investigate whether Sharia investors
dampen corporate tax avoidance practices
by responding negatively. As previously
mentioned, Sharia investors are guided by
the Sharia principles in which tax noncompliance is a sinful act that violates the
obligation to manage funds, including those
that must be paid to the government as taxes
(Alam et al. 2017).
Tax Avoidance
Tax avoidance in this study is broadly
defined as anything that reduces corporate
tax relative to profit before tax. This
definition follows Dyreng et al. (2008)
since the clear boundaries of tax avoidance
practices are not known. In this regard,
Merks et al. (2007) identified that tax
avoidance practices can be done in several
ways, i.e., by (1) transferring tax subjects
and/or tax objects to countries that provide
special tax treatment or tax relief (tax haven
country) for certain types of income; (2)
maintaining the economic substance of
transactions through formal elections that
provide the lowest tax burden (formal tax
planning); (3) using the Anti-Avoidance
provisions for transfer pricing transactions,
thin capitalisation, treaty shopping, and
controlled foreign corporations (Specific
Anti Avoidance Rule).
According to Hanlon and Heitzman
(2010), tax avoidance is a continuum of tax
planning strategies that are completely
legal at one end—i.e., research and
development claims, investments in assets,
tax saving—and illegal on the other end—
i.e., tax aggressiveness, tax evasion, tax
noncompliance. In practice, tax avoidance
tends to be carried out using certain
methods and techniques in exploiting the
“grey area” in tax regulations (Pohan 2013;

Blaufus et al. 2016; DeZoort et al. 2018).
Specifically, this type of tax avoidance
aims to minimize the tax burden by taking
advantage of the weaknesses of a country’s
taxation regulations (Suandy 2001; Brown
2012; Feller and Schanz 2017).
As the findings regarding the
market’s reaction to corporate tax
avoidance are still mixed (Hanlon and
Heitzman 2010), there are two views
regarding this practice identified in the
literature. Some opinions (e.g., Tresch
2002; Darussalam and Septriadi 2008;
Xynas 2011) considered tax avoidance as a
legal practice because it does not violate
existing provisions. Further, McGuire et al.
(2014) explained that tax avoidance is
beneficial for increasing tax savings as a
way to increase cash flow. In this way, tax
avoidance creates value because it will
increase the current period’s net income
and the shareholders’ wealth (Akbari et al.
2018, 2019). However, this value is
impaired when tax avoidance is carried out
with opportunistic motives (Wang et al.
2019). Proponents of the agency view of tax
avoidance include Slemrod (2004), Chen
and Cu (2005), and Crocker and Slemrod
(2005).
Tax Avoidance on Islamic Perspective
Tax avoidance is considered as an
action that is contrary to Islamic law
because it is close to bad intentions, since
bad deeds to avoid taxes are harmful to the
state. Emzaed et al. (2018) explained that
the intention/motivation to avoid taxes is a
manifestation of bad faith (instead of good
faith). In this sense, Alam et al. (2017)
stated that tax avoidance is a morally sinful
behavior under Sharia principles. More
specifically, the payment of a certain
amount of tax to the government is a form
of managing company funds that will be
accountable to God in the hereafter
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2007). Thus, failure to
pay taxes, regardless of motivation,
especially because of opportunistic tax
avoidance, is a sinful act.
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To the extent that the relationship
between the taxpayer and the government
can be viewed as an implicit contract
(Scholz 2003), Islam emphasizes good faith
as the main prerequisite to be strongly
upheld by the parties involved in the ‘tax
contract’. If there is a breach of contract
made by one of the parties, i.e., the
taxpayer, it means that he has initiated bad
intentions in the tax reporting system and
has committed an act of injustice
(Walkshäusl and Lobe 2012). Furthermore,
if this behavior by chance goes undetected
by the tax authorities, God will always
know what we are doing, even what it is in
our hearts and when bad intentions have not
been executed. This is consistent with
Quran Surah Hashr verse 18:

over investors (Scott 2015), supporting the
need for belief adjustment.
Applying the context of this study,
BAT is used to explain how Sharia investor
beliefs change about firms that claim to
follow Sharia principles but engage in tax
avoidance practices. In this case, the initial
belief of investors is that Sharia-based firms
will choose strategies, carry out operations,
and engage in activities that are not against
Islamic law. Therefore, when these firms
are involved in tax avoidance practices, the
initial belief of Sharia securities investors
will be “shaken”, and they will immediately
revise their beliefs. In addition, the revised
belief is then reflected in firms’ stock prices
as the information is used in decision
making.

“O believers! Be mindful of Allah and
let every soul look to what deeds it has
sent forth for tomorrow. And fear
Allah, for certainly Allah is AllAware of what you do.”

Hypothesis Development
As indicated in the literature review
by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), empirical
research on tax avoidance related to market
reactions shows mixed results, reflecting
two conflicting views of tax avoidance. On
the one hand, tax avoidance is perceived as
a value-creating activity so that it is
responded positively by investors (Kirchler
et al. 2003). In line with this argument, Goh
et al. (2016) and Lim (2011) find that taxavoiding firms enjoy lower costs of capital.
On the other hand, tax avoidance is viewed
as an opportunistic behavior that
exacerbates agency problems (Desai and
Dharmapala 2009; Balakrishnan et al.
2019; Kim et al. 2011). Supporting this
view, Blaufus et al. (2019) show that there
is a negative stock market response towards
tax evasion practice in Germany. In
addition, both Kim et al. (2011) and Brooks
et al. (2016) report the positive association
between tax avoidance and stock market
risks. Table 1 summarizes the findings of
previous studies on the consequences of tax
avoidance.
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) state that
the magnitude of the market’s reaction
depends on investors’ perceptions of
corporate tax avoidance. This idea becomes
our basis to build an argument related to a

and Surah Taghabun verse 4:
“He knows whatever is in the heavens
and the earth. And He knows
whatever you conceal and whatever
you reveal. For Allah knows best what
is hidden in the heart.”

Belief-Adjustment Theory
Belief-adjustment theory (BAT)
explains how individual decision-making is
strongly influenced by their beliefs on the
basis of available information (Hogarth and
Einhorn 1992). In this regard, Beaver
(1989) stated that decision-making behavior will change when new information
becomes available, thereby changing one’s
beliefs. Individuals will change their beliefs
through the anchoring and adjustment
process (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). This
theory is based on the assumption that in
processing information, an individual does
it gradually either because of limited
memory capacity or cognitive constraints
(Simon 1955). Moreover, the presence of
separation of control and ownership gives
management an information advantage
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Table 1
Summary of Previous Research on The Consequences of Tax Avoidance
Author(s)
Desai and Dharmapala
(2009)
Hanlon and Slemrod
(2009)
Kim et al. (2011)
Lim (2011)
Abdul Wahab and
Holland (2012)
Chen et al. (2014)

Dependent Var.

Independent Var.

Result

Sign

Not significant

-

Firm value

Tax avoidance

Stock price reaction

Tax aggressiveness

Significant

-

Stock price crash risk
Cost of debt

Tax avoidance
Tax avoidance

Significant
Significant

+
-

Firm value

Tax planning

Significant

-

Goh et al. (2016)

Firm value
Agency costs
Firm stock return
Stock market risk
Cost of equity

Significant
Significant
Not significant
Significant
Significant

+
+
-

Brushwood et al. (2017)

Equity market values

Significant

-

Cook et al. (2017)

Significant

+

Tax aggressiveness

Significant

-

Blaufus et al. (2019)

Cost of equity (ex-ante)
Transparency of information environment
Stock market response

Tax avoidance
Tax avoidance
Tax avoidance
Tax avoidance
Tax avoidance
Permanent BTD by
stock-based compensation
Tax avoidance

Tang (2019)

Firm value

Legal tax planning
Illegal tax planning
Tax avoidance

Not significant
Significant
Significant

+
+

Brooks et al. (2016)

Balakrishnan et al. (2019)

different capital market reaction between
Sharia securities investors and non-Sharia
investors, supported by belief-adjustment
theory. Sharia-compliant firms are
expected to implement and comply with
Islamic law in all their strategies,
operations, and activities. Specifically,
according to Islamic law, firms operated
based on Sharia principles must avoid involving in unethical and completely
unacceptable (haram) activities, stay away
from all types of usury and interests (riba),
sidestep from uncertain (gharar) and
gambling transactions, maintain the number of its assets in a way that liquid assets
do not dominate, and obedient with paying
taxes (Alam et al. 2017). This is an initial
belief and basis for the perception of
company practices by Sharia securities
investors.
As devout Muslims tend to invest in
Sharia-based funds (Jamaludin and Gerrans
2015), this type of investors will evaluate
new-discovered information regarding their
Sharia investment portfolios based on its
compliance with Islamic law (Borgers et al.
2015; Pasewark and Riley 2010; Wan

Ahmad et al. 2008). When a Shariacompliant
company
commits
tax
avoidance, which is considered a sinful act
(Alam et al. 2017), Sharia investors will
change down their initial belief towards that
company since its behavior does not reflect
the value it is supposed to uphold. This
revised belief will then be used as a new
basis for making investment decisions
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Since tax
avoidance is a bad practice according to
Islamic law, a negative market reaction by
Sharia securities investors is expected.
Different from non-Sharia securities
investors who may perceive tax avoidance
as a positive behavior under certain
conditions (Akbari et al. 2018, 2019),
religious investors cannot tolerate tax
avoidance that is inconsistent with Sharia
principles (Wan Ahmad et al. 2008). As
Sharia investors are expected to adhere to
Sharia principles, this type of investor can
be seen as controlling corporate tax
avoidance practices. This disciplinary
mechanism is analogous to other types of
ownership. For example, Khurana and
Moser (2013) show that firms held by long-
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Table 2
Total Observations
Initial observations of 167 companies, 11 years (2008-2018)
Less: observations with missing data used to estimate the expected return using a
market model
Less: observations with missing data used to estimate corporate tax avoidance
Less: observations with missing data of financial variables used for control variables
Less: observations trimmed for the corporate tax avoidance, debt issuance, and
leverage variables
Final observations

term institutional investors engage in less
tax avoidance practices. Similarly, Chen et
al. (2010) find that family firms are less
aggressive in avoiding tax than their counterparts. In addition, related to this study
context, Boone et al. (2013) document that
religiosity is negatively associated with tax
avoidance aggressiveness.
The discussion leads to the
expectation that the overall market may
respond positively or negatively depending
on the perception of whether tax avoidance
will create value or not. However, the
Sharia investors do not favor any kind of
tax avoidance practices as it contradicts the
Sharia principles, resulting in a negative
response. Taken together, when the overall
market perceives tax avoidance as valuecreating (value-deteriorating) activity so
that respond positively (negatively) to it,
the Sharia investors’ response is lower/
more negative in positivity (negativity).
Thus, this study hypothesis can be stated as
follows:
H1: Sharia securities investors respond
more negatively than non-Sharia
securities investors to corporate tax
avoidance regardless of how the
market perceives it (positive or
negative).
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Data and Sample
This study uses an observation period
of 2008-2018. The sample comprises the
manufacturing companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The total initial

1,837
1,053
153
86
545

observations amounted to 1,837 firm-year
observations. The sample was then selected
based on the criteria of data availability for
analysis. Furthermore, observations with
extreme outliers were also omitted from the
sample. The final number of observations
consisted of 545 firm-year observations
consisting of 378 observations for Sharia
securities and 167 observations for nonSharia securities. In the final sample, the
remaining number of companies was 123
companies. Table 2 depicts these
procedures.
The data used in this study were
obtained from several sources, i.e.,
Thomson Reuters database, the Decrees of
the OJK (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/Financial
Services
Authority)
Board
of
Commissioners regarding Sharia Securities
List for 2007-2017, and the yahoo finance
page. Data on the companies’ daily share
price, income before and after-tax, income
tax expense, financial statement announcement date, total assets, total liabilities,
and market capitalization were taken from
the Thomson Reuters database. The daily
data on market returns (Jakarta Composite
Index return) during the study period were
taken from the yahoo finance page
(https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/^JKSE/).
Meanwhile, the Decrees of the OJK Board
of Commissioners regarding the Sharia
Securities List for the period of 2007-2017
were used to identify the securities type.
Measurement of Variables
CAR refers to 7 days (-3, 0, +3)
cumulative abnormal return and represents
the dependent variable used to test the
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hypothesis. A market model introduced by
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) is used to
estimate the expected return component for
the main proxy of CAR. This model has
been widely used in previous studies (e.g.,
Al-Thaqeb 2018; Armstrong et al. 2010;
Ikenberry et al. 1995). In substance, the
procedures to be followed for computing
CAR are (1) calculating actual return, (2)
estimating expected return, (3) calculating
abnormal return, and (4) calculating
cumulative abnormal return.
In this study, the event date (day 0) is
the financial statement announcement date.
If the company reports after March 31 of
the following year for a financial statement
at a particular year, the event date used is
the maximum date for reporting the
financial statements (March 31). The
estimation period used is 200 days, that is
203 to 4 days before the event date.
Tax_avoid represents the corporate
tax avoidance that is proxied by STR - ETR
in this study. STR denotes the Indonesian
statutory tax rate, which is 25%. ETR is an
effective tax rate and is calculated as a
percentage of tax expense over its reported
income before tax. The lower ETR means
the more corporate tax avoidance engaged
by the company. For ease of interpretation,
this study deducted the ETR (in percentage)
from STR so that the larger value of
Tax_avoid represents more corporate tax
avoidance. This proxy has been widely
used by previous studies in the taxation
literature, especially those investigating tax
avoidance on equity matters. Some of them
are Rego (2003), Dyreng et al. (2008),
Abdul Wahab and Hollad (2012), Chen et
al. (2014), Brushwood et al. (2017), and
Tang (2019).
For example, Company A has a tax
expense of Rp500,000 and income before
tax of Rp2,500,000. The level of tax
avoidance (Tax_avoid) engaged by
Company A can be calculated as STR –
ETR with an ETR equal to tax
expense/income before tax. That way, the
value of Tax_avoid for Company A in

certain year is 5% or 0.05 (25% {Rp500,000/Rp2,500,000}).
Sharia is an identifier variable that is
used to differentiate between the Sharia and
non-Sharia securities. Sharia is expressed
in the form of a dummy variable with nonSharia securities as the base. Therefore, this
variable has a value of 1 for Sharia
securities and 0 for otherwise. The
classification for Sharia and non-Sharia
securities is based on the Sharia Securities
List issued by OJK (Otoritas Jasa
Keuangan).
Several control variables that may
affect the company’s stock price other than
the tax avoidance are included in the model.
Those are leverage (Abdul Wahab and
Holland 2012; Cook et al. 2017; Tang
2019), firm size (Rego 2003; Chen et al.
2014; Cook et al. 2017; Tang 2019), growth
(Kim et al. 2011; Goh et al. 2016; Thaker et
al. 2020; Brushwood et al. 2017), debt
issuance (M’ng et al. 2019), and market
capitalisation (Kim et al. 2011; Goh et al.
2016; Brushwood et al. 2017). The
description and measurement of the
variables used in this study are summarized
in Table 3.
Model Specification
The model used in the multiple
regression analysis to evaluate the effect
magnitude of the independent variables can
be stated as follows:
CARi,t,7 = α + β1Tax_avoidi,t + β2Shariai,t +
β3Tax_avoidi,t*Shariai,t + β4Sizei,t
+ β5Growthi,t + β6Debt_issuei,t +
β7Leveragei,t + β8Market_capi,t +
Year-Fixed Effect + ℇi,t
(1)
where CARi,t,7 is 7-days cumulative
abnormal return of firm i in year t;
Tax_avoidi,t is the level of corporate tax
avoidance engaged by firm i in year t;
Shariai,t is a dummy variable that indicates
the securities type of firm i in year t;
Tax_avoidi,t*Shariai,t is an interaction
between the level of corporate tax
avoidance and securities type of firm i in
year t; Sizei,t is the size of firm i in year t;
Growthi,t represents the growth of firm i in
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Table 3
Variables Description and Measurement
Variable
CAR

Description
Cumulative abnormal
return

Tax_avoid

Corporate tax avoidance

Sharia

Securities type

Size
Growth

Firm size
Firm growth

Debt_issue
Leverage
Market_cap

Debt issuance
Leverage
Market capitalisation

year t; Debt_issuei,t indicates the business
risk of firm i in year t; Market_capi,t shows
the market capitalization of the firm i in
year t; Year-Fixed Effect is used to capture
factors outside the model that vary between
years that might affect the cumulative
abnormal return; dan ℇ denotes the error
terms.
Prior to the analyses, we performed a
trimming procedure to three variables in the
model. The three variables are Tax_avoid,
Debt_issue, and Leverage, since they are
indicated to contain observations with
extreme outlier data. The trimming
procedure was performed on observations
with defined limits at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Specifically, this means
discarding observations that lie outside the
defined limits which in this study are less

Measurement
Cumulative abnormal return is estimated using
the following procedures.
1. Calculating actual return
Ri,t = [(Pi,t - Pi,t-1)/ Pi,t-1]
(2)
2. Estimating expected return using market
model by Brown and Warner (1980,1985)
E[Ri,t] = [𝛼̂ i + 𝛽̂iRM,t]
(3)
3. Calculating abnormal return
ARi,t = Ri,t – E[Ri,t]
(4)
4. Calculating cumulative abnormal return
CARi = ∑𝑡=+3
(5)
𝑡=−3 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
where Ri is an actual return of a firm, P is the stock
price, E[R] is the expected return, RM is the market
return (Jakarta Composite Index return), AR is the
abnormal return, and CAR is the cumulative
abnormal return.
This variable is proxied by (STR - ETR), in which
ETR (Effective Tax Rate) is calculated as follows.
ETR = (Tax Provision/ Income Before Tax) x 100
An indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the share
of a firm identified as Sharia securities, and 0
otherwise.
The natural logarithm of the total assets of a firm.
The market-to-book ratio of common equity of a
firm.
The percentage change in total liabilities of a firm.
Debt to equity ratio of a firm.
The natural logarithm of the market capitalisation
of a firm.

than data on the 1st percentile or more than
data on the 99th percentile. Because the
ETR contains a high number of outliers, the
trimming procedure for Tax_Avoid variable
was done with the 5th and 95th percentiles
limits.
Several statistical analyses were
conducted in this study. While descriptive
statistics portray data patterns, the
correlation matrix indicated whether there
was a multicollinearity problem that would
bias the results. Mean and median
difference tests using t-test and Chi-square
test were aimed to discover the presence of
the significant differences between the two
types of securities. ANOVA was used to
determine whether the difference in market
response to tax avoidance between Sharia
and non-Sharia investors was statistically
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Table 4
Model Selection
Chow test
LM test
Hausman test
a

Ho
PLS/Common
effect
PLS/Common
effect
Random effect

H1

Statisticsa

p-value

Fixed effect

0.97

0.5802

0.00

1.000

22.62

0.0039

Random
effect
Fixed effect

Conclusion
PLS/Comm
on effect
PLS/Comm
on effect
Fixed effect

Statistics for each test can be specified as follows: F-statistics for Chow test, 𝜒 2 for LM test, χ2 for Hausman test.

meaningful. To test the hypothesis in a
detailed sense, i.e., the market response of
Sharia investors is less positive (more
negative) to corporate tax avoidance than
non-Sharia securities investors, multiple
regression analysis was employed. To
corroborate the results, a partition
regression analysis was performed and the
coefficients of the tax avoidance variable
were compared using the Chi-square test.
Multiple regression analysis was
carried out using the pooled-least square
method which was selected based on the
results of the panel data model selection test
(for a detailed discussion, see Gujarati and
Porter 2009). Specifically, the rejection of
the null hypothesis in the Chow, LM, and
Hausman tests means the use of fixed-effect
instead of common effect, random effect
instead of common effect, and fixed effect
instead of random effect, respectively
(Gujarati and Porter 2009; Wooldridge
2016). The inability to reject the null
hypothesis suggests otherwise. As shown in
Table 4, the null hypothesis of the Chow
test and LM test cannot be rejected. This
implies that the most efficient estimation
was achieved using the common effect, or
known also as the pooled-least square,
method. This method is also consistent with
the consideration to increase the sample
size (Wooldridge 2016).
The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to
indicate the normality of the residual, while
the Breusch-Pagan test was operated to
detect the heteroskedasticity in the residual
(Wooldridge 2016). Because there was
evidence that the residual of the model
suffered from non-normality (z = 7.862, pvalue < 0.01) and heteroscedasticity (χ2 =

31.07, p-value < 0.01), a robust standard
error was applied in all regression analyses
(Gujarati and Porter 2009). To control for
confounding effects, regression with
propensity score matching was applied in
all analyses unless otherwise indicated. The
propensity score matching originally came
from the experimental study to balance the
characteristics in the treated group and
untreated group in order to control for
unobserved factors, thereby reducing bias
due to confounding variables (Rosenbaum
and Rubin 1983; Austin 2011). Later, the
archival data study used it to address
endogeneity problems that may arise from
omitted variables (e.g. Koester et al. 2017),
and self-selection bias due to sample
partitioning (e.g. Wang et al. 2017; Gul et
al. 2018).
This study conducted a series of
robustness tests by replacing the expected
return estimation model from the market
model to the mean-adjusted model and the
market-adjusted model, using ETR and
reverse ETR as a proxy for corporate tax
avoidance, and estimating the model using
a fixed-effect method. The series of tests
were carried out to ensure that the results
were consistent across the proxies to
measure variables and data estimation
methods used.
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 5 reports descriptive
statistics that summarize and show the data
patterns of all variables so that they are
more meaningful (Keller 2018; Lind et al.
2017). While the mean and median values
represent the central location of the data,
the standard deviation, 25th percentile, and
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample
CAR
Tax_avoid
Shariaa
Size
Growth
Debt_issue
Leverage
Market_cap

n
784
1,440
1,603
1,582
1,370
1,519
1,568
1,235

Mean
0.7374
2.3417
0.6089
26.1589
2.7635
0.1189
1.2598
27.5811

Std. Dev.
6.9711
14.5153
0.4882
3.7501
6.5321
0.3376
6.9046
2.1607

Skewness
0.6951
0.7862
-0.4461
-1.0212
4.3742
1.9473
-18.6353
0.5390

Kurtosis
6.1005
5.3497
1.1990
2.9871
24.1492
11.5539
451.1507
3.0084

25%
-2.2981
-3.4882
0
25.6635
0.4597
-0.0509
0.4443
26.0419

Median
0.0005
-0.0413
1
27.2515
0.7532
0.0665
1.0329
27.2473

75%
3.7572
6.1299
1
28.4129
1.8019
0.2222
1.8114
28.9314

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of All Variables by Securities Type
Sharia
Non-Sharia
Diff. Mean
Diff. Median
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
CAR
0.5121
-0.3749
1.0801
0.7571
***
Tax_avoid
0.4624
-0.1797
5.3918
0.1769
***
**
Size
26.4017 27.3028 25.7722
27.1353
***
Growth
2.7152
0.7284
2.8735
0.8292
Debt_issue
0.1351
0.0789
0.0914
0.0456
***
**
Leverage
0.9869
0.7685
1.7047
1.6941
**
***
Market_cap
27.6987 27.3813 27.3529
26.9402
***
***
a
Due to a dummy variable, the mean value indicates the proportion of Sharia securities in the sample.
* **
, , and *** denotes a difference in the mean (median) under a t-test (Chi-square test) with a two-tailed pvalue of less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01

75th percentile indicate how dispersed the
data is relative to its mean (Keller 2018;
Lind et al. 2017). All variables except CAR,
Tax_avoid, Growth, and Leverage have
relatively small standard deviations, and
close mean and median values, which
suggest the variables are symmetrically
distributed. However, the non-normal
variables due to a quietly large standard
deviation can still be used in the further
analysis as long as the study sample is large
enough to follow the central limit theorem
(Hair et al. 2019).
The dependent variable, CAR, has a
mean of 0.7374 and a standard deviation of
6.9711. About 69.36% of the securities in
this study are classified as Sharia, while the
level of corporate tax avoidance as the
difference between STR and ETR has a
mean of 2.3417. Since the smaller the
difference between STR and ETR means
lower tax avoidance, this serves as a good
sign that the expectation about Sharia
investors playing a role in disciplining
misbehavior may be supported.
Panel B Table 5 shows the mean and
median comparison test using t-test and

Chi-square test to determine whether there
is a significant difference between the two
groups of security types. Based on the Chisquare test on differences in median values,
this study found Sharia securities had
higher returns than non-Sharia securities.
This is consistent with the findings of AlKhazali et al. (2014) that the Islamic stock
index outperformed its peers during and
after crisis periods around the world and
over time in Europe. We also documented
that the level of corporate tax avoidance
practices was lower for Sharia securities
than non-Sharia securities. As suggested by
Haniffa and Hudaib (2017), bad use of
funds entrusted to the company may also be
punished in the hereafter. Therefore,
companies declaring as Sharia securities
will refrain from tax avoidance practices
that are sinful under morality and Islamic
law (Alam et al. 2017). In addition, the
results show that the larger size, higher
amount of debt issuance, lower leverage,
and
higher
market
capitalisation
characterized Sharia securities.
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
df

Mean Square

F-statistic

p-value

2.16

0.0920*

0.02
0.68

0.8830
0.4097

4.72

0.0301**

Model
3
107.7692
Main Effects
Tax_avoid
1
1.0828
Sharia
1
34.0278
Two-way Interaction
Tax_avoid x Sharia (H1)
1
236.1008
Residual
695
49.9971
* **
, , and *** represent significance at level 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01

Table 7
Correlation Matrix
V1
V2
1.0000
-0.1650***
1.0000
-0.1062***
0.0817***
-0.0013
-0.0112
-0.0743***
0.0626**
-0.0856***
-0.0505**
-0.0381
0.0758***
V5
V6
V5: Debt_issue
1.0000
V6: Leverage
0.0144
1.0000
V7: Market_cap
0.0487*
0.0177
* **
, , and *** represent significance at level 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
V1: Tax_avoid
V2: Sharia
V3: Size
V4: Growth
V5: Debt_issue
V6: Leverage
V7: Market_cap

EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Prior to testing the hypothesis in more
detail, we conducted a two-way ANOVA
with interaction as a preliminary analysis to
get knowledge of whether there is a
statistically meaningful difference in
market response to corporate tax avoidance
between Sharia and non-Sharia securities
investors (Keller 2018). Table 6 reports the
result of ANOVA analysis which indicates
that the coefficient of interaction between
Tax_avoid and Sharia is statistically
significant (F = 4.72, p-value < 0.05). The
result implies that the market response to
corporate tax avoidance differs between
Sharia and non-Sharia securities. Since
devout Muslim investors opt for Sharia
instruments or funds to invest in (Jamaludin
and Gerrans 2015; Wan Ahmad et al.
2008), it can be said that Sharia investors
respond to tax avoidance practices diffe-

V3

V4

1.0000
-0.0013
0.1034***
0.0314
0.3671***
V7

1.0000
-0.0204
0.0248
0.3020***

1.0000

rently than their counterparts. In this case,
religious values and beliefs determine the
way a person views certain firm behavior
(Boone et al. 2013) and thus his investment
decision (Walkshäusl and Lobe 2012).
Correlation Matrix
Table 7 presents the correlations of
all the independent variables included in the
model. The correlations were used to assess
if there is a serious multicollinearity issue
stemming from high correlations between
the independent variables in the regression
model. Specifically, a multicollinearity
problem arises if the pairwise or zero-order
correlation coefficient among the independent variables is more than 0.80 and
statistically significant (Gujarati and Porter
2009). As indicated in Table 7, in this study,
the highest correlation was between Size
and Market_cap (0.3671, p-value < 0.01)
which was still below the maximum
allowed correlation of 0.80. Thus, there is
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Table 8
Full Sample Regression Resultsa
(1)
Pooled Least Squareb
Coef. Est.
t-stat.
2.6039
0.68
0.0492
1.30*
0.1515
0.21
-0.0949
-2.05**
0.0784
0.88
-0.0313
-1.11
0.5218
0.63
-0.0604
-0.52
-0.0873
-0.59

(2)
Propensity Matching Scorec
Variable
VIF
Coef. Est.
t-stat.
VIF
Intercept
-7.8428
-2.41***
Tax_avoid
2.41
0.0843
4.02***
1.70
Sharia
1.24
1.8662
3.46***
1.10
Tax_avoid x Sharia
2.31
-0.1199
-3.47***
1.58
Size
1.21
0.3687
4.59***
1.30
Growth
1.16
-0.0272
-0.92
1.19
Debt_issue
1.05
-0.0138
-0.02
1.06
Leverage
1.08
0.2279
2.98***
1.11
Market_cap
1.38
-0.0490
-0.37
1.50
1.62
1.71
Year-fixed effect
Yes
Yes
n
545
726
Adj. R2
0.0719
0.1408
F-value
4.14***
9.18***
a
Robust standard error is used due to the non-normality and heteroscedasticity of residuals.
b
Panel regression using the common effect method.
c
To control for confounding effects, the propensity matching score is used throughout the analyses in this study
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Austin 2011).
* **
, , and *** represent significance at level 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01

no severe multicollinearity problem detected based on the correlation analysis.
In addition, an interesting result from
Table 7 is that there is a statistically
significant negative correlation between
Sharia and Tax_avoid (-0.1650, p-value <
0.01). This supports the previous finding
that Sharia-compliant companies are
engaged in lower tax avoidance. In this
regard, these companies internalize the
principles they hold so that these are
reflected in their strategies, operations, and
activities. Moreover, to the extent that tax
avoidance involves exploiting “grey areas”
in the country’s taxation system (Pohan
2013; Blaufus et al. 2016; DeZoort et al.
2018), companies adhering to Sharia
principles tend to sidestep to tax avoidance
as it is a dubious activity. Related to this
matter, Prophet Muhammad SAW said:
“Leave that which makes you doubt
for that which does not make you
doubt.” (Reported by at-Tirmidhi
and an-Nasa'i. Sahih Tirmidhi)

Regression Analysis
In addition to the correlation analysis
to detect multicollinearity, the VIF for both
the individual variables and the model (see
Table 8 and Table 9) also shows favourable
values. The VIF for the model used in this
study ranged from 1.62 to 5.95, which is
still below the rule of thumb of 10. There is
also evidence that the presence of the
interaction term does not inflate the VIF of
the model. Overall, this study model does
not suffer from the multicollinearity
problem. Hence, it is expected that the
results reported in this study are not driven
by bias due to a multicollinearity problem.
Completing the ANOVA analysis,
multiple regression with interaction was
carried out to determine the direction and
magnitude of differences in market
responses as the hypothesis tested was in a
one-tail form. The conclusion regarding the
hypothesis is indicated by the sign and
significance of the interaction term
coefficient, which is expected to be
negative. Since Sharia is a dichotomous
variable, the interaction term reflects the
prediction that the market responses to
corporate tax avoidance practices should be
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Table 9
Sub-Sample Analysisa
Panel A: Regression results

Variable
Intercept
Tax_avoid
Size
Growth
Debt_issue
Leverage
Market_cap

(1)
Sharia securities
Coef. Est.
t-stat.
4.1702
0.93
-0.0453
-1.69**
0.1700
1.65**
-0.0169
-0.58
0.0059
0.01
-0.0457
-0.14
-0.2541
-1.42*

VIF
1.03
1.18
1.15
1.03
1.07
1.32
1.66

(2)
Non-Sharia securities
Coef. Est.
t-stat.
-13.5529
-3.15***
0.0888
3.93***
0.5213
4.32***
-0.0057
-0.09
0.3996
0.29
0.1595
1.84**
0.0488
0.26

VIF
1.18
1.54
1.33
1.19
1.28
1.86
1.90

Year-fixed effect
Yes
Yes
n
378
348
Adj. R2
0.0412
0.2717
F-value
2.35***
14.36***
Panel B: Pairwise comparisonb
Comparison
chi-square stat.
p-value
Sharia vs non-Sharia
15.15
0.0001***
a
Robust standard error is used due to the non-normality and heteroscedasticity of residuals.
b
Chi-square test of the Tax_avoid coefficient across securities type on the regression panel A. The significant
statistic indicates that there is a difference in market responses between Sharia and non-Sharia investors
regarding tax avoidance.
* **
, , and *** represent significance at level 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01

different among securities types (Hayes
2018). In other words, the interaction term
specifies the average market responses of
Sharia investors to tax avoidance relative to
the average market responses of non-Sharia
investors in the same direction as the
coefficient sign.
As shown in Table 8, the coefficient
of the interaction term is negative and
statistically significant in both regressions
with (-0.1199, p-value < 0.01) and without
the propensity score matching procedure
applied (-0.0949, p-value < 0.05). By
deriving equation (1) by tax avoidance, we
are able to obtain the marginal effect of tax
avoidance based on the securities type, and
better interpret the coefficient of the
interaction term to test the hypothesis
(Burks et al. 2018). As an example, the
marginal effect of tax avoidance on market
responses is 0.0843 - 0.1199*Sharia in the
propensity score matching regression. This
means that for a certain level of tax
avoidance, the market response of Sharia
securities investors differs on average by 0.1199 compared to the market response of

non-Sharia investors, ceteris paribus. The
same way of analysis and interpretation
applies to the regression without propensity
score matching. Thus, the hypothesis that
Sharia investors respond lower to corporate
tax avoidance practices than non-Sharia
investors is supported.
This finding is in line with beliefadjustment theory. Once a Shariacompliant company violates principles
underlying it, for example by doing tax
avoidance, the initial belief of Sharia
investors will be disrupted and thus revised
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). This adjusted
initial belief is then reflected in the market
response that is more negative than the
market response by non-Sharia investors.
To obtain more convincing evidence
in supporting this study hypothesis, we
perform sub-sample analyses consisting of
partition regression analysis and pairwise
comparison. The results, as reported in
Panel A Table 9, show that Sharia securities
investors respond negatively (-0.0453, pvalue < 0.05), while non-Sharia securities
investors respond positively (0.0888, p-
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Table 10
Robustness Checka
Panel A: Alternative proxy for the dependent variable
Variable
Intercept
Tax_avoid
Sharia
Tax_avoid x Sharia
Size
Growth
Debt_issue
Leverage
Market_cap

(1)
Mean-adjusted modelb
Coef. Est.
t-stat.
-2.4436
-0.60
0.0338
1.60*
1.0247
1.91**
-0.0529
-1.55*
0.1678
2.43***
0.0139
0.41
0.1506
0.15
0.0085
0.18
-0.0463
-0.35

Year-fixed effect
n
Adj. R2
F-value

Yes
1,225
0.1616
13.99***

VIF
1.90
1.17
1.69
1.24
1.16
1.08
1.13
1.37
2.00

(2)
Market-adjusted modelc
Coef. Est.
t-stat.
VIF
-17.6611
-4.28***
0.1013
4.40***
1.93
1.4739
2.56***
1.21
-0.1207
-3.41***
1.69
0.0107
0.16
1.17
-0.0588
-2.42***
1.18
-0.3959
-0.42
1.09
0.0950
1.57*
1.11
0.3709
2.68***
1.33
1.91
Yes
1,225
0.2192
25.93***

Panel B: Alternative proxy for the independent variable

Variable
Intercept
Tax_avoid
Sharia
Tax_avoid x Sharia
Size
Growth
Debt_issue
Leverage
Market_cap
Year-fixed effect
n
Adj. R2
F-value

(1)
Effective tax rated
Coef. Est.
t-stat.
-5.7355
-1.75**
-0.0843
-4.02***
-1.1302
-1.25
0.1199
3.47***
0.3687
4.59***
-0.0272
-0.92
-0.0138
-0.02
0.2279
2.98***
-0.0490
-0.37
Yes
726
0.1408
9.18***

VIF
1.70
3.14
4.15
1.30
1.19
1.06
1.11
1.50
2.06

(2)
Reverse effective tax ratee
Coef. Est.
t-stat.
VIF
-12.0337
-3.19***
0.0557
2.19**
1.91
8.8027
2.95***
29.09
-0.0913
-2.42***
28.47
0.3241
3.94***
1.35
-0.0296
-1.01
1.19
-0.3309
-0.43
1.06
0.3821
4.22***
1.23
-0.0155
-0.12
1.50
5.95
Yes
717
0.1467
10.42***

a

Robust standard error is used due to the non-normality and heteroscedasticity of residuals.
Instead of using a market model to estimate the expected return, the mean of the actual return of securities during the
estimation period is used.
c Instead of using a market model to estimate the expected return, the market return at the corresponding date in the event
period is used.
d Instead of using a difference between STR and ETR to proxy tax avoidance, the original ETR is used.
e Instead of using a difference between STR and ETR to proxy tax avoidance, the reverse value of ETR (100-ETR) is used.
*, **, and *** represent significance at level 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
b

value < 0.01) to tax avoidance. To find out
whether these responses can be said to be
different, we conducted a Chi-square test
on the Tax_avoid coefficients in columns
(1) and (2) Panel A of Table 9. We found a
significant Chi-square statistic (15.15, pvalue < 0.01) which means the market
response to corporate tax avoidance
between Sharia and non-Sharia investors is
different.

According to Hanlon and Slemrod
(2009), investors’ perceptions of tax
avoidance affect their responses to it. As
investors’ perceptions are shaped by their
personal values (Anand and Cowton 1993;
Pasewark and Riley 2010; and Borgers et
al. 2015), the negative response of Sharia
investors to tax avoidance reflects the
application of values and beliefs they hold,
i.e., the Sharia principles or Islamic law, in
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Table 11
Fixed Effect Estimationa
Variable
Intercept
Tax_avoid
Sharia
Tax_avoid x Sharia
Size
Growth
Debt_issue
Leverage
Market_cap
Year-fixed effect
n
Adj. R2
F-value

Coef. Est.
5.1557
0.0863
-1.4099
-0.1004
-0.1873
0.0445
-0.3418
-0.1015
0.0933

Std. Errorb
42.6588
0.0536
1.3109
0.0654
1.5613
0.1257
0.9979
0.2672
0.5822

t-statistics
0.12
1.61*
-1.08
-1.54*
-0.12
0.35
-0.34
-0.38
0.16

VIF
2.41
1.24
2.31
1.21
1.16
1.05
1.08
1.38
1.62

Yes
545
0.0986
4.32***

a

Panel regression using fixed effect method.
Robust standard error is used due to non-normality and heteroscedasticity of residuals.
* **
, , and *** represent significance at level 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
b

interpreting and responding to corporate
practices. In this regard, tax avoidance is
intolerable to Sharia investors (Wan
Ahmad et al. 2008), since it is considered a
morally sinful practice under Sharia
principles (Alam et al. 2017). In addition,
the positive market reactions by non-Sharia
investors are probably due to they perceive
tax avoidance as an activity that creates
value through increased cash flow, net
income, and shareholder wealth (McGuire
et al. 2014; Akbari et al. 2018; 2019).
Robustness Check
To ensure that the results of this study
do not depend on the proxy used to measure
the variables and the estimation method
applied, a series of robustness tests were
performed. Panel A Table 10 presents the
regression results after replacing a market
model with a mean-adjusted model and a
market-adjusted model to estimate the
expected return for calculating CAR (e.g.,
Brushwood et al. 2017; Blaufus et al. 2019).
The regression results with the alternative
proxies of tax avoidance, i.e., effective tax
rate (e.g., Brooks et al. 2016) and reverse
effective tax rate (e.g., Goh et al. 2016), are
reported in Panel B Table 10. This study
also re-estimates model (1) by changing the

estimation method used from the common
effect method to the fixed-effect method.
The reasons are (1) the fixed-effect method
is typically used to address the effect of
omitted variables on the relationship
between variables in the model
(Wooldridge 2016); and (2) the Hausman
test shows that the fixed-effect method fits
the data better in this study (Table 4).
The interaction term coefficient in the
regression across the alternative proxies for
both the CAR and Tax_avoid variables are
consistent with that of the main analysis.
Particularly, we found a negative and
statistically significant coefficient of the
interaction term for the mean-adjusted
model (-0.0529, p-value < 0.10), marketadjusted model (-0.1207, p-value < 0.01),
and reverse effective tax rate (-0.0913, pvalue < 0.01) regressions. Because the
lower ETR indicates higher tax avoidance,
we document evidence of a positive and
statistically significant coefficient of the
interaction term for the effective tax rate
regression (0.1199, p-value < 0.01).
Accordingly, the finding in the main
analysis is robust towards the selection of
proxies to measure variables in confirming
the hypothesis. In addition to the results to
support the hypothesis, the regression

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, June 2021, Vol. 18, Iss. 1, pg. 33-54

analyses employed in this study also show
weak evidence that larger size, lower
growth, higher leverage, and larger market
capitalization are associated with higher
return.
Finally, we conducted a regression
analysis with a fixed effect estimation
method. As presented in Table 11, the
interaction term is still statistically
significant in the expected direction (0.1004, p-value < 0.10). Thus, our main
result is robust in supporting the hypothesis
and is not determined by the model
estimation method used. Therefore, it can
be concluded that Sharia investors respond
negatively to corporate tax avoidance
compared to non-Sharia investors. In other
words, the personal values held by
investors affect their investment decisions
(Anand and Cowton 1993; Pasewark and
Riley 2010; Borgers et al. 2015). Moreover,
Sharia ownership is a potential mechanism
for controlling corporate tax avoidance as a
deviant behavior similar to institutional
ownership (Khurana and Moser 2013) and
family ownership (Chen et al. 2010).
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study is to
investigate whether investors’ personal
value
determines
their
investment
decisions. In particular, the role of Sharia
ownership in disciplining corporate tax
avoidance as a bad practice under Islamic
law is examined. Using comprehensive
analyses, the results show that the market
response associated with corporate tax
avoidance practices is on average lower for
the Sharia securities. Another finding is that
firm characteristics also explain the market
responses, i.e., there is a higher market
response for firms with a larger size, larger
market capitalization, lower growth, or
higher leverage.
However, this study has limitations in
several ways. First is the complex nature of
determining the event date because the
company does not officially announce its
tax avoidance practice. Second, Indonesia
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has not distinguished between the capital
market that trades Sharia securities and
non-Sharia securities. Third, this study is
limited to only the manufacturing industry
for certain reasons. Retesting using another
setting of industry or country may be
worthwhile.
Forth, the assumption held by this
study in testing the hypothesis is that Sharia
securities are more demanded by religious
(devout
Muslim)
investors.
This
assumption is not to say that non-Sharia
investors are not religious, non-Muslim
investors are disobedient, or non-Muslim
investors do not invest in Sharia securities.
Rather, this is due to the inability of this
study to control for religion and religiosity
of the individual investors because of the
absence of such measures or proxies in the
database. Thus, future research might
validate this study result by investigating
the same issue, but using other research
methods, such as experiment and survey,
which do not face these limitations.
Altogether, the results of this study
provide initial empirical evidence regarding
the role of investors’ religious values in
influencing investment decisions as
reflected in market response differences to
tax avoidance practices in Muslim majority
country, Indonesia. Therefore, this study
results may be applied as a matter of
consideration in the other countries that
have a similar environment to Indonesia.
Given the continuously increasing
number of Sharia securities in Indonesia’s
capital market and the evidence of Sharia
securities lead to higher returns, further
research can be also carried out to answer
these questions: “Why are the companies
willing to move to Sharia securities from
the non-Sharia ones?;” “Are the Sharia
securities more attractive to investors than
the non-Sharia securities?;” and “Does the
company get a competitive advantage by
becoming a Sharia security?”
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